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EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS: IS SIGNIFICANT BODILY
INJURY THE SINE QUA NON TO PROVING A
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION?
INTRODUCTION
Before the Supreme Court's recent decision in Graham v. Connor,' fed-
eral courts were divided 2 regarding the specific constitutional right impli-
cated when a plaintiff alleged that a police officer used excessive force3
during arrest. The Graham Court resolved that uncertainty. It held that
all claims' alleging that law enforcement officials5 used excessive force in
the course of arrest, investigatory stop or other "seizure" should be ana-
l. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
2. Before Graham, most federal courts looked to the fourteenth amendment, analyz-
ing excessive force claims under a substantive due process standard. See Rinker v.
County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1987); Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481,
484-85 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d
780, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1986); Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (1lth Cir. 1986);
Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986); Fundiller v. City of
Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d
1495, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Putman v. Gerloff,
639 F.2d 415, 420-22 (8th Cir. 1981); Eng v. Coughlin, 684 F. Supp. 56, 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
Other courts analyzed excessive force claims applying fourth amendment principles.
See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 867-69 (4th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d
237, 261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713-14 (7th Cir.
1987); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1027 (1988); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1987); Jenkins v. Averett,
424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970); see also Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force,
1987 Duke L.J. 692, 694-701 (examining disparate approaches to excessive force claims);
Note, The "Reasonable"Approach to Excessive Force Cases Under Section 1983, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 136, 140-47 (1989) (discussing divergence of constitutional standards uti-
lized by federal courts in excessive force claims); Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Re-
moving the Double Standard, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1369, 1370-81 (1986) (same).
3. See, eg., Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir. 1989) (officers beat un-
resisting plaintiff during arrest causing multiple bruises and lacerations); Calamia v. City
of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989) (police officer applied handcuffs tightly
and kept plaintiff in an unreasonable position for hours); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871,
872 (5th Cir. 1989) (officer forcibly twisted arrestee's arm, which later required surgery);
Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 478 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam) (plaintiff
alleged that after he peacefully submitted to arrest, officer verbally abused him, treated
him roughly and applied handcuffs so tightly that his wrists had permanent scars); Hen-
son v. Thezan, 717 F. Supp. 992, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (state trooper struck quiescent
plaintiff in groin while he was lying on the ground before being handcuffed).
4. These claims are brought under Section 1983 of Title 42 ("section 1983") which
reads:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5. Typically, excessive force claims are brought against police officers or other law
enforcement officials in their individual and official capacities. See, e.g., Miller v. Lovett,
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lyzed under the fourth amendment6 rather than the substantive due pro-
cess standard of the fourteenth amendment.7
Accordingly, section 1983 claimants must now demonstrate that an
officer's use of force amounted to an "unreasonable seizure"' in violation
of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment reasonableness in-
quiry is wholly objective, examining whether the officers' actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
officers without regard to the officers' underlying intent.9
A reading of Graham and other federal court decisions suggests that
the constitutional threshold in excessive force claims is met once a jury
concludes that an officer's use of force was objectively unreasonable.'0 In
the wake of Graham, however, some federal courts have implicitly re-
jected this interpretation by requiring a plaintiff to show that he sus-
tained a "significant or meaningful injury" separately from proving that
the officer's conduct during arrest was objectively unreasonable. I By
imposing this requirement, these courts have effectively heightened the
879 F.2d 1066, 1066 (2d Cir. 1989) (officer sued individually and in official capacity);
Pastre v. Weber, 717 F. Supp. 987, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
Courts generally find that officers sued in their individual and official capacities have
qualified immunity provided they do not violate "clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The test of qualified
immunity is an objective one: would a reasonable police officer believe that his actions
did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights? See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). After Graham, police officers invoking a qualified
immunity defense must show that a reasonable police officer would have found their ac-
tions to be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Plaintiffs may sue a local municipality under section 1983 for any custom or policy that
deprives an individual of a federal constitutional right. See Monell v. Department of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719
(10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The Court recently held, however, that a "single incident"
of police behavior does not sufficiently manifest a custom or pattern of police activity.
See City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see also City of Canton v.
Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1210 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Tuttle
with approval).
Even though section 1983 does not address unconstitutional actions under color of
federal law, a plaintiff may nonetheless bring a cause of action against such actors under
federal and state common law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
6. The fourth amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable... seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
7. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989).
8. A "seizure" triggering the fourth amendment's protection occurs only when gov-
ernment actors have "by means of physical force or show of authority.., in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen." Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.10 (1989) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
9. See Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
10. Although Graham did not explicitly state whether the question of "objective rea-
sonableness" was for a judge or jury, this inquiry is presumably for the jury. See, e.g.,
Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (objective unreasonableness a jury
question); Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1070 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Calamia v. City of
New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1033-35 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d
1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
11. See cases supra note 93.
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fourth amendment reasonableness standard to one closely resembling the
substantive due process standard that the Court rejected in Graham.
Part I of this Note surveys judicial treatment of excessive force claims
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham. Part II analyzes the
Court's holding in Graham against the backdrop of its prior fourth
amendment balancing jurisprudence. Part III examines the divergent ap-
proaches to determining whether the amount of force applied during an
arrest was constitutionally excessive. Part IV concludes that a "signifi-
cant or meaningful" injury requirement does not comport with the
Supreme Court's decisions in Graham and Tennessee v. Garner 2 and
thwarts the broad 3 remedial purposes of section 1983.
I. PRE-GRAHAM ANALYSIS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS
A. Substantive Due Process Standard
Prior to Graham, most courts' 4 analyzed excessive force claims under
a substantive due process standard 5 governed by the fourteenth amend-
12. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). For a discussion of Garner, see infra notes 129-131.
13. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (Section 1983 is accorded "'a sweep as
broad as its language.' ") (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
14. Some courts, however, presaged the Supreme Court's decision in Graham by
holding that excessive force claims are properly analyzed under the fourth amendment.
See supra note 2. In the seminal circuit court case, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff went to the police station to retrieve her father from jail.
See id. at 708. Upon her arrival, a confrontation between the plaintiff and the attending
desk officer ensued. Although there was some conflicting evidence, all parties agreed that
the police arrested the plaintiff, took her to a nearby office and handcuffed her to a radia-
tor. See id. at 709. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of her treatment, she sustained
bruises to the back of her leg and scratched wrists because of tightly applied handcuffs.
See id. She sued the police officer under section 1983 for using excessive force against
her. At trial, the judge charged the jury under the fourteenth amendment "shock the
conscience" test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled by, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th
Cir. 1987). The plaintiff filed an appeal asserting that the jury charge was improper.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed and held that the fourth amendment was the
exclusive constitutional right implicated in an excessive force claim. See Lester, 706 F.2d
at 712. Faced with the challenge of determining the appropriate standard, the Lester
court surveyed relevant Supreme Court decisions since Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952). See Lester, 830 F.2d at 710-13. The court noted a definitive shift from a substan-
tive due process "shocks the conscience" standard to an objective fourth amendment
analysis in the area of personal security. See id. at 711; see also Freyermuth, supra note 2,
at 707-08 (arguing substantive due process is no longer applicable to excessive force
claims in light of post-Rochin Supreme Court decisions); Comment, supra note 2, at
1379-81 (discussing demise of substantive due process standard in excessive force cases).
15. The substantive due process doctrine recognizes limitations on the use of govern-
ment power not explicitly supported in the text of the Constitution. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (woman's right to abortion a privacy interest protected
by fourteenth amendment). See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-2
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing non-textual constitutional rights of privacy). Accordingly,
under a substantive due process standard, plaintiffs would allege that law enforcement
officials, in applying excessive or undue force during arrest, deprived them of liberty in-
terests guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See supra note
2 (cases applying substantive due process standard).
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ment. 16 In order to appraise the constitutionality of a law enforcement
official's conduct during arrest, most courts applied versions of the
"shock the conscience" test17 suggested by Judge Friendly in Johnson v.
Glick." Judge Friendly's test requires the fact finder to assess four fac-
tors when determining whether police conduct during arrest 9 "shocked
the conscience": 1) the need for the officer's application of force, 2) the
relationship between the amount of force needed and the amount that
was used, 3) the severity of the planitiff's injuries, and 4) whether force
was applied in good faith. 0
Judge Friendly's "shock the conscience" test, did not enjoy uniform
interpretation, however. 21 The test engendered judicial disagreement as
16. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[njo State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
17. The "shock the conscience" test originated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952). In Rochin, the Court reversed a defendant's criminal conviction because a
police officer had obtained inculpatory evidence in a manner that "offend[ed] even hard-
ened sensibilities" and "shock[ed] the conscience." Id. at 172. Specifically, the officer
forced an emetic into defendant's stomach, causing him to vomit, in order to retrieve
drug capsules later used against defendant at trial. See id. at 166. The Court employed a
substantive due process analysis, asserting that the officer's shocking conduct deprived
defendant of a substantive "liberty" interest guaranteed under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 168-69. For a discussion of the substantive due
process doctrine as it relates to excessive force claims, see Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due
Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201, 226-34 (1984) (tracing
origin of substantive due process analysis in excessive force claims to Rochin);
Freyermuth, supra note 2, at 694-95 (same).
18. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). In Johnson v. Glick, a
prisoner sued a police officer under section 1983 alleging that the officer violated his
constitutional rights. See id. at 1029-3 1. Specifically, Johnson maintained that the officer
beat him when he hesitated to heed the officer's order. Johnson further alleged that the
officer subsequently denied him medical attention. See id. at 1029-30. The court rejected
Johnson's eighth amendment claim, holding that the officer's actions did not constitute
"punishment" under the eighth amendment. See id. at 1032. The court did hold, how-
ever, that Johnson's claim should be remanded and reevaluated under a substantive due
process standard, adopting the "shock the conscience" test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Rochin. See id. at 1032-34.
For courts applying Judge Friendly's test, see, Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d
829, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1987); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986);
Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1216 (1st Cir. 1986); Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d
415, 420 (8th Cir. 1981); Eng v. Coughlin, 684 F. Supp. 56, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Greene
v. City of New York, 675 F. Supp. 110, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
19. Although the plaintiff in Glick was a pre-trial detainee, Judge Friendly's standard
has been consistently applied to excessive force claims alleging misconduct during arrest.
See Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014
(1988); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City of
Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1986); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777
F.2d 1436, 1439-42 (11th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 581-83 (6th Cir.
1985) (en bane); see also Comment, supra note 2, at 1376 (discussing application of Glick
test in arrest cases). This Note addresses only excessive force claims arising out of inves-
tigatory stops or police conduct during arrest.
20. See Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
21. See Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to Personal Se-
curity Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of
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to whether it required a showing of significant bodily injury before exces-
sive force claimants could recover under section 1983.22 Some courts
held that only "serious ' '2 3 or "severe" 4 injuries are actionable under sec-
tion 1983. These courts adhered to a "shock the conscience" test, em-
phasizing that not every tort committed by a law enforcement official
deprives a petson of a liberty interest guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 25 Accordingly, section 1983 plaintiffs in these jurisdictions
were not compensated for minor injuries.26
In other judicial fora, a finding of severe injury was not required.27
Underscoring the second prong of the Glick test, judges in these jurisdic-
tions instructed juries to focus on whether the amount of force was justi-
fied under the circumstances. A serious injury requirement was not
imposed. 8 Juries could find that a constitutional violation had occurred
even when the plaintiff suffered no serious bodily injury as a result of
mistreatment during arrest.
For example, in Lewis v. Downs,29 a police officer, after subduing the
plaintiff, kicked her in the back and buttocks as she lay face down on the
ground.3 0 Although the plaintiff was not seriously injured, the court
found that the plaintiff had nevertheless demonstrated a claim capable of
redress under section 1983 and held that serious or permanent injury is
the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 Alb. L. Rev 173, 178 (1987); Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 1373; see also Wells & Eaton Constitutional Torts, supra note 17, at
234-36 (lack of Supreme Court guidance resulting in varied application of Glick test).
22. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1373.
23. See Ricketts v. Derello, 574 F. Supp. 645, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
24. See Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled by, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir.
1987); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Comment, supra note
2, at 1373 (requirement of severe injury comports with fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence).
25. See, e.g., Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)
(not every personal injury by state officer constitutes fourteenth amendment violation, for
some injuries are so small as to occasion only a tort claim); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
613 (4th Cir. 1980) (not every violation of state tort law is a violation of substantive due
process). See generally Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A
Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 515, 544-47
(1989) (discussing blurred distinctions between civil rights claims and common law tort
actions).
26. See Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 266; Derello, 574 F.2d at 647.
27. See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987) (severe or permanent
injuries not required under section 1983); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir.
1986) (no physical injury required for section 1983 claim); Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711,
714 (6th Cir. 1985) (serious or permanent injury not a prerequisite); Norris v. District of
Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no threshold requirement of perma-
nent injuries); Bowman v. Casler, 622 F. Supp. 836, 838 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (no severe or
permanent injury required); see also Wells & Eaton, supra note 17, at 248-50 (rejecting
necessity of severity of injury requirement); cf. Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 36 (2d
Cir. 1983) (gratuitous and excessive force not causing permanent injury still actionable
under section 1983).
28. See Downs, 774 F.2d at 714; Norris, 737 F.2d at 1152.
29. 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985).
30. See id. at 712.
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not a prerequisite to such a claim.3 1 The court emphasized that in exces-
sive force claims the facts surrounding the application of force should be
carefully scrutinized and weighed,32 an approach which resembles the
"totality of circumstances" approach eventually endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Graham.
II. GRAHAM V CONNOR: FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS
INQUIRY BECOMES EXCLUSIVE STANDARD IN ExcESSIVE
FORCE CLAIMS
In Graham, the Supreme Court refused to apply substantive due pro-
cess principles to Graham's section 1983 claim alleging that a police of-
ficer used excessive force during arrest.33 Graham, a diabetic, asked his
companion, Berry, to drive him to a convenience store so that he could
buy orange juice in order to counteract a sugar reaction.34 After entering
the store and seeing the number of people on line, Graham hurried out of
the store and instructed Berry to drive him to a friend's house.3 5
The police officer saw Graham hastily leave the store and conducted
an investigatory stop. Although Berry told the officer that Graham was
experiencing an insulin attack, the officer ordered Berry to wait while he
ran an investigatory check. While the officer was in his squad car, Gra-
ham got out of Berry's car, ran around it twice and passed out on the
ground.36
Another officer arrived on the scene, rolled the unconscious Graham
over and handcuffed his hands tightly behind his back, ignoring Berry's
plea for medical assistance. Some time during the arrest, Graham sus-
tained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists and a bruised forehead.37
Graham filed suit in district court under section 1983 claiming that the
officers had used excessive force during arrest.38 The district court ana-
lyzed the claim under the substantive due process standard, applying the
four-factor Glick test.39 Finding that the amount of force was not consti-
tutionally excessive, the district court granted the officer's motion for di-
rected verdict.4' Without attempting to identify the specific
constitutional provision under which that claim arose, a divided panel of
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding, holding that the
31. See id. at 714.
32. See id.
33. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989).
34. See id. at 1868.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Graham v. Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d
945, 946 (4th Cir. 1987).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 248-49.
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force applied was not unconstitutionally excessive.4
Affirming the holding implicit in Garner, the Supreme Court reversed
the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides [the] explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, [and] that Amend-
ment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must
be the guide for analyzing these claims."'42 The Court remanded Gra-
ham's claim to the district court for reconsideration under the fourth
amendment standard.43
On remand, a jury employing the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard would likely find in favor of Graham. The record readily sug-
gests that the officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances. Because Graham was apparently unconscious when ap-
prehended, the officer's use of force was clearly inappropriate. More-
over, the officers' failure to acknowledge Graham's medical condition, in
the face of repeated warnings that he was suffering from an insulin reac-
tion, further militates toward a finding of unreasonableness.
A. Fourth Amendment Balancing Principles
When fact finders are asked to determine whether the force used dur-
ing an arrest was "objectively unreasonable," Graham requires them to
balance "'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake."'  The Graham Court did not elaborate on the meth-
odology of this balancing test, however.
41. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 1865 (1989).
42. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. The Court explicitly declined to decide whether the
fourth amendment continues to provide protection against the deliberate use of physical
force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins. See id. at 1871
n.10. The federal courts remain divided on this issue. Some courts have held that the
fourth amendment's protection continues to apply beyond initial arrest to pretrial deten-
tion. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (use of physical
force applied during detainment following plaintiff's arrest for driving while intoxicated
analyzed under fourth amendment); Henson v. Thezan, 717 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (fourth amendment's protections extend until probable cause hearing before
judicial officer); Jones v. County of Du Page, 700 F. Supp. 965, 971 (N.D. Ill 1988)
(same). Others have applied substantive due process standards once the arrest has been
completed. See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (fourth amend-
ment protections end after initial arrest when police officers have suspect securely in
custody).
43. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (1989).
44. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72; see Tenpiessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). See gener-
ally Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1014-16
(1973) (discussing balancing principles); Urbonya, supra note 21, at 201-04 (same); Com-
ment, Double Standard, supra note 2, at 1386 (same); Note, The Civil and Criminal Meth-
odologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 Yale L.J. 1127, 1128-44 (1984) (same).
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Prior to Graham, the Supreme Court had employed fourth amend-
ment balancing principles to analyze an excessive force claim brought
under section 1983 only once.45 The Court's balancing analysis in Gar-
ner, however, is not particularly illustrative of the Court's balancing
scheme in general. Garner was an easy case because the plaintiff's inter-
est in preserving his life clearly out-weighed the government's interest in
apprehending a non-violent fleeing felon." The Court did not specify the
fourth amendment interests threatened when police officers use non-
deadly physical force during arrest.47
Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence under section 1983 is ob-
viously limited. Therefore, in order to identify these interests, as fact
finders invariably must, it is helpful to review the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment balancing methodology as applied in the context of criminal
proceedings.
1. Plaintiff's Interests
Although the Court arrived at different conclusions in Winston v.
Lee4" and Schmerber v. California,49 it emphasized in both cases that
"the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect [individ-
uals'] personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State."5 Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio,"1 Justice Warren, writing for the
45. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
46. See id. at 9.
47. See id. The Court noted that "[tihe intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly
force is unmatched." Id.
48. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). In Winston, the Court invoked balancing principles to ana-
lyze a proposed surgical operation into the chest muscle of an armed robbery suspect to
search for evidence-a bullet allegedly fired by the victim. See id. at 763-66. Weighing
Winston's interests in "privacy and bodily integrity" against the state's interest in procur-
ing marginally probative evidence, the Court struck the balance in favor of Winston's
dignity interests, holding that the proposed surgery was not reasonable under the fourth
amendment. See id. at 764. The Court noted that fourth amendment intrusions typically
do not injure the physical person, but "damage the individual's sense of personal privacy
and security." See id. at 762.
49. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, a somewhat less serious physical intrusion
was held not to offend the criminal defendant's fourth amendment interests. The Court
decided that a warrantless seizure of a blood sample from a DWI suspect was reasonable
under the fourth amendment. See id. at 772. The sample was obtained in a medically
acceptable manner but over the objections of the defendant. See id. at 759.
Applying balancing principles, the Court considered the particular type of intrusive
procedure and the manner in which the test was performed. See id. at 771-72. Finding
that the procedure "involve[d] virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," the court held that the
measure was reasonable in light of the state's interest in enforcing drunk driving laws.
See id. at 771. The Court, however, limited its holding to the precise facts at issue, assert-
ing that the Constitution permits such intrusions under "stringently limited conditions."
See id. at 772.
50. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767); see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968). But see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("The Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen-the interest
in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy.").
See generally Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
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majority, broadly characterized the personal security and privacy inter-
ests protected by the fourth amendment:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law ...
[W]herever an individual may harbor a 'reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
* 52intrusion.
The Court, however, has yet to elaborate on the vague characteriza-
tions5 3 of fourth amendment interests articulated in Schmerber, Terry
and Winston.54 Instead, it seems that the Court generally devotes most
of its balancing analysis to examining the purported governmental inter-
ests at stake when evaluating the reasonableness of a particular seizure.
2. The Government's Interests
In excessive force claims, the government's primary interest is in the
apprehension of criminal suspects.5 That interest is jeopardized when-
ever a suspect forcibly resists arrest or attempts to avoid detention by
fleeing.56 The government is also concerned about the health and safety
of police officers who are often confronted by armed or otherwise danger-
ous suspects during the course of an arrest or investigatory stop. 7
As the Court made clear in Chimel v. California,5" it is entirely reason-
able for a police officer "to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endan-
gered, and the arrest itself frustrated."59 Moreover, the government has
an interest in preventing arrestees from concealing or destroying evanes-
Protection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583, 591-98 (1989) (discussing plaintiffs' fourth amendment
interests); Urbonya, supra note 21, at 204-11 (same); Comment, supra note 2, at 1385-86
(same).
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. Id. at 9 (citations omitted). The Terry Court depicted a limited bodily frisk, per-
formed pursuant to an investigatory stop, as a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly." Id. at 17.
53. One commentator has posited that any attempt to place an objective value on
fourth amendment rights would fail because individuals invariably differ in their percep-
tion of what constitutes an invasion of privacy or personal security. See Note, Protecting
Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 Yale L.J. 313, 327 (1981).
54. Justice Powell has even suggested that an individual subject to custodial arrest
"retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person." United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
55. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 & n.8 (1985).
56. Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1985).
57. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
59. Id. at 763.
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cent evidence during arrest.6°
Accordingly, the Graham Court recognized that "the right to make an
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use
some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it."'61 The
Court's apparent deference to varying degrees of physically coercive po-
lice conduct derives from and comports with the common-law tort prin-
ciple that police officers are privileged in making forcible arrests. 62
B. Not Every Push or Shove Is a Fourth Amendment Violation
The Graham Court explicitly warned that" '[n]ot every push or shove,
even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's cham-
bers,'. . . violates the Fourth Amendment., 63 The Court undoubtedly
wanted to afford police officers a reasonable amount of authority to com-
bat violent crime on increasingly violent streets.'
Accordingly, the Court endorsed a "reasonableness at the moment"
standard that requires fact finders, when assessing the reasonableness of a
particular seizure, to take into account the unpredictable dynamics of the
arrest environment .6  The Court noted that police officers are often
forced to make "split-second judgments" about the amount of force nec-
essary in a particular situation under circumstances that are "tense, un-
certain, and rapidly evolving.",66
As the Court did not explain its "not every push or shove" admoni-
tion, Glick may offer an explanation. In Glick, the majority opined that
the constitutional protection for prisoners bringing excessive force claims
under section 1983 is not as extensive as that afforded by state law bat-
tery actions. 67 The court distinguished a simple battery, where "the least
touching of another in anger" constitutes actionable conduct at common
law, from a constitutional tort actionable under section 1983.68 It rea-
soned that the management of prisoners, "not usually the most gentle or
tractable of men and women," may demand "the occasional use of a de-
60. See id.; see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (limited police search
justified to protect highly evanescent evidence).
61. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989).
62. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). The rule has been tempered in
modem times so that "[tihe use of force against another for the purpose of effecting the
arrest or recapture of the other, or of maintaining the actor's custody of him, is not
privileged if the means employed are in excess of those which the actor reasonably be-
lieves to be necessary." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 132 (1965).
63. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)); see Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1070
(2d Cir. 1989); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1987).
64. Cf Note, supra note 2, at 155.
65. See Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.
66. See id.
67. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973).
68. See id.
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gree of intentional force."69
Extending these observations from Glick to the pre-detention arrest
scenario, police officers often must deal with hostile and potentially dan-
gerous suspects. Peaceable suspects may, without warning, offer harmful
or deadly resistance at any time during the arrest. A police officer may
incorrectly anticipate an arrestee's gestures, responding with coercive
physical force. Graham's language suggests that in these circumstances
police officers enjoy immunity for the application of such force, even
though in hindsight the use of such force seems unnecessary.7 °
C. Totality of Circumstances
As both Graham and Garner mandate, a fact finder, when attempting
to distinguish privileged force from constitutionally excessive force, must
look to whether the "totality of circumstances"'" justified the use of
force. Under the Graham test, a fact finder must consider the "severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the plaintiff] is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."'72
From Graham's three-part test, it follows that when the crime or of-
fense is relatively minor and the suspect neither resists nor attempts to
flee, the use of significant physical force may be constitutionally exces-
sive. The state's justification for applying force in those situations would
be obviated by the suspect's peaceful submission to arrest.73 Therefore,
even minimal physically intrusive police conduct may offend an arres-
tee's fourth amendment rights where the government's law enforcement
interests are not justified under the circumstances.74 These situations are
likely to arise when a police officer has neutralized a placid suspect and
subsequently applies unnecessary physical force.
This was precisely the situation in Johnson v. Morel.75 The plaintiff in
Morel, a black man, was driving across a bridge with four black passen-
gers. 76 After the car stalled on the bridge, a white police officer began
pushing Johnson's stalled vehicle with a squad car while shouting racial
epithets. 7 When the cars reached the foot of the bridge, Johnson got out
69. Id.
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1985)); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (fourth amendment
protects against unjustified intrusions but not against reasonable ones); Lester v. City of
Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987) (question is whether totality of circumstances
justified police conduct); Comment, supra note 2, at 1378 (discussing totality of the cir-
cumstances approach in Garner).
72. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9).
73. See Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (4th Cir. 1985).
74. Cf Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (simple pat-down search violated
individual's fourth amendment rights where government's justification was feeble).
75. 876 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam).
76. See id. at 478.
77. See id.
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of his vehicle and peacefully submitted to the officer's investigation.78
Despite Johnson's acquiescence, the officer continued to verbally abuse
him, promising to make an example of him.79 After discovering that
Johnson had failed to renew his driver's license, the officer searched and
arrested Johnson, applying handcuffs so tightly that they caused severe
lacerations on his wrists that left permanent scars.8 0 As a result of the
incident, Johnson was unable to return to work for two weeks.81
After reviewing Johnson's excessive force claim under a fourteenth
amendment standard that required a showing of "objectively severe inju-
ries," the district court granted summary judgement for the defendant
police officer.8 2 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, citing Graham, reinstated
and remanded Johnson's claim to the district court to be evaluated under
a fourth amendment standard. 3 A jury undertaking Graham's fourth
amendment reasonableness inquiry would arguably find that under the
circumstances, the police conduct was constitutionally excessive.
Likewise, in Ramirez v. Webb,84 plaintiffs were physically and men-
tally harassed after being seized by a border patrol agent.85 As a result of
the incident, the plaintiffs complained of negligible physical injury, plead-
ing only that they sustained bruises and back pain. 6 Their primary
claim involved emotional injury-shock, fear, humiliation, and embar-
rassment.8 7 Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' lack of palpable bodily harm,
the plaintiffs were held to be entitled to compensatory damages for a
violation of their fourth amendment rights.88
Employing Graham's three-factor test, Ramirez held the officer's de
minimis use of force unreasonable under the circumstances.8 9 The deci-
sion noted that the potential crime at issue-illegal presence in the coun-
try-was not one generally involving violence,90 that the plaintiffs did
not pose a threat to the officer's safety and that no evidence indicated
that they actively resisted arrest.9" The Ramirez court therefore held
that it was "unnecessary and unreasonable" for the agent "to grab [the
plaintiff] forcibly, ... to force him to walk to the patrol car, and to push
or shove him against the car."9 2  Not all lower courts, however, have
followed Graham so precisely.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Johnson v. Morel, 843 F.2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1988).
83. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (per curiam).
84. 719 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
85. See id. at 615.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 617-18.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id.
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III. DIVERGENT STANDARDS AFrER GRAHAM
Federal courts have not applied Graham's fourth amendment standard
uniformly.93 In response to Johnson's appeal, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc in Morel held that in order to prevail on an excessive force claim
under section 1983 a plaintiff must prove three separate elements: "(1) a
significant injury which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of
force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of
which was (3) objectively unreasonable." 94
Interestingly, a showing of objective unreasonableness, the sole inquiry
mandated by the Graham Court, is only one of three elements a plaintiff
must prove to sustain an excessive force claim in the Fifth Circuit. The
Morel majority offered scant reasoning for imposing additional require-
ments to the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry set forth in Gra-
ham.95 Citing no authority,96 the Morel court briefly discussed the
inevitable unpleasantness of the arrest experience and concluded that
"[a]n officer's use of excessive force does not give constitutional import to
... minor harms."
97
The Fifth Circuit's rationale for creating a significant injury require-
ment seems to derive from earlier fourteenth amendment jurisprudence
in which the court applied a "shock the conscience" test to excessive
force claims. Similar language appears in Shillingford v. Holmes,98 a
Fifth Circuit case overruled by Morel. By incorporating shades of the
more stringent fourteenth amendment standard into its fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence, the Morel court has seemingly hybridized the two
standards.
Shillingford emphasized that not all physical injuries sustained during
93. Some courts mandate a showing of "significant or meaningful" physical injury
before a plaintiff can make out a fourth amendment violation under section 1983. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam) (in
addition to objective unreasonableness, defendant must also prove he sustained "signifi-
cant [bodily] injury"); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1989) (following
Morel's "significant injury" requirement); Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218, 1223
(W.D. Tex. 1989) (meaningful injury required). Other courts leave the question of
whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred to the jury, irrespective of the extent
of the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989)
(jury question whether police violated fourth amendment where plaintiff sustained only
trifling injuries); Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)
(same); see also Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (Judge Easterbrook
disagrees with Fifth Circuit's "significant injury" requirement).
94. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam).
95. The Morel dissent noted that "[a]lthough the [Graham] Court did not rule on the
[significant injury] question explicitly, its opinion surely contains no quantum-of-injury
criterion." Id. at 481. Moreover, the Morel dissent criticized the majority for confecting
a new causation requirement that compels plaintiff to prove that his injury resulted "'di-
rectly and only'" from the use of excessive force. See id. (Rubin, J., dissenting).
96. The dissent in Morel observed that the majority imposed these added require-
ments "without so much as a citation of authority or a statement of reasons for imposing
them." Morel, 876 F.2d at 480 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 480.
98. 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981).
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arrest amount to constitutional violations under the fourteenth amend-
ment.99 Where the injuries are slight, the court urged plaintiffs to seek
redress by pursuing battery claims in state court."°° The Morel court
apparently wanted to limit the claims brought into federal courts under
section 1983.10
With respect to Johnson's claim, the Fifth Circuit held that a jury
must determine whether Johnson's injuries were constitutionally signifi-
cant.10 2 Apparently unconvinced that Johnson had successfully pleaded
a fourth amendment violation under this test, the court cast doubt on the
validity of Johnson's claim, noting that Johnson's injuries were of a "dif-
ferent order" than the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in Graham.10 3
Similarly, in Palmer v. Williamson, "°a Texas district court held that a
plaintiff must demonstrate "meaningful" physical injury in order to es-
tablish an excessive force claim under the fourth amendment.10 5 In
Palmer, a sixteen-year-old plaintiff brought an excessive force claim
against a police officer who attempted, at gunpoint, to pull the plaintiff
from a moving automobile because the plaintiff had been speeding
through the off-duty police officer's neighborhood.10 6 The court rejected
Palmer's claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the officer
because the plaintiff's physical injuries were "nothing major."'0 7
Although the decision in Palmer acknowledged that Graham required
a fourth amendment reasonableness standard, it effectively retained the
stringent substantive due process standard used prior to Graham, omit-
ting only the scienter requirement of Judge Friendly's four-part test.108
The court found that a remaining prong of the substantive due process
test-that the plaintiff sustained a "meaningful" injury-need not be dis-
carded for the test to conform with the fourth amendment reasonable-
ness standard. 10 9
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. An attempt to distinguish substantively between excessive force claims under the
fourth amendment and common-law battery claims against police officers is a difficult
task. The jury questions in each are essentially the same. Compare State v. Montgomory,
230 Mo. 660, 132 S.W. 232 (1910) (fact finder must evaluate whether the amount of force
used to effect an arrest was necessary in light of surrounding circumstances) with Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (question is whether totality of circumstances justi-
fied amount of force used to effect arrest). An extended discussion of the separation of
common-law and constitutional torts is, however, beyond the scope of this note.
102. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam).
103. See id. As a result of mistreatment during arrest, Graham suffered a broken foot,
cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead and an injured shoulder. See Graham v. Connor,
109 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (1989).
104. 717 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
105. See id. at 1223.
106. See id. at 1219.
107. Id. at 1223. Apparently, the plaintiff's wrists were bruised from the handcuffing
during arrest.
108. See id. at 1221-22.
109. See id.
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Since Graham, other circuits have implicitly recognized that a showing
of significant physical injury is not the sine qua non to proving a fourth
amendment violation. 110 In Hansen v. Black, 1 the Ninth Circuit re-
versed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a police officer in an
excessive force claim where the officer's conduct caused the plaintiff mi-
nor physical injuries.112
Specifically, Mrs. Hansen's complaint alleged that the officer's treat-
ment during arrest caused her bruises on her wrists and upper arm. 3 A
witness testified that the arresting officer was "using unnecessary force
and the situation did not warrant [it, and]... [w]hen the policeman hand-
cuffed Mrs. Hansen he was rough and abusive to her person."' 1 4
Employing Graham's fourth amendment reasonableness standard, the
Ninth Circuit held that if a jury believed Mrs. Hansen's version of the
facts, the officer's use of force was "objectively unreasonable" in light of
the circumstances confronting the officer, and therefore violated the
fourth amendment. 15
Similarly, in Calamia v. City of New York,1I 6 the Second Circuit, citing
Graham, ordered that the excessive force claim be heard by a jury to
determine whether the police officer's use of force during the arrest was
unreasonable under a fourth amendment standard.1 1 7 Apparently, the
plaintiff had suffered no permanent injury as a result of his mistreatment
during arrest. 18 Instead, he contended that the officer had applied hand-
cuffs too tightly and forced him to sit in an uncomfortable position for
several hours."1 9 The Second Circuit made no reference to a threshold of
injury requirement.
110. See, e.g., Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's claim
with stood summary judgment motion while alleging only minor injuries); Calamia v.
City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1989) (excessive force not necessarily
significant physical injury); Ramirez v. Webb, 719 F. Supp. 610, 617 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
(plaintiff awarded compensatory damages despite failure to show significant bodily
injury).
111. 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the plaintiff's son had been suspected of
robbing a local gas station, police officer Black had been instructed to watch plaintiff's
home until a search warrant could be obtained. See id. at 643. When the plaintiff
emerged from the house carrying two trash bags and walked to the street where a garbage
truck had stopped, the officer told her to leave the bags at the curb. See id. When the
plaintiff proceeded to put the garbage into the truck, the officer then attempted to retrieve
the bags himself. See id.
The facts conflicted as to whether the plaintiff tried to hinder the officer's efforts to
retrieve the trash, but the officer nonetheless arrested the plaintiff. See id.
112. See id. at 645.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. 879 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1989).
117. See id. at 1035. Originally, the claim had been improperly brought under the
fourteenth amendment.
118. See id. at 1035.
119. See id.
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IV. QUANTUM-OF-INJURY REQUIREMENT NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry requires a fact finder to
address only one question: was the amount of force used by the officer
objectively reasonable given the totality of circumstances? 20 It is the
objectively unreasonable seizure itself that crosses the constitutional
threshold regardless of whether the plaintiff sustained severe physical in-
juries.12 ' Therefore, proper construction of the fourth amendment
should emphasize the reasonableness of a seizure rather than focusing
myopically on the severity of a plaintiff's bodily injuries.' 22
The Fifth Circuit, however, appraises the constitutionality of police
conduct according to a three-part test.'2 3 A finding of "significant in-
jury" must be established independently of a finding that a police officer's
conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. 124 In
other words, a fourth amendment seizure can never be unconsdtitutional
if the plaintiff's injuries are slight. Accordingly, any complaint that does
not plead that police conduct caused "significant injuries" will be dis-
missed,' 2 5 and the jury will never decide the issue of reasonableness.
A significant or meaningful injury requirement can prevent a fact
finder from determining the reasonableness of an officer's conduct in
light of the "totality of circumstances." For example, the facts in Palmer
indicate that the arresting officer's behavior may well have led a jury to
conclude that the officer acted unreasonably under the circumstances.
Yet, in Palmer, a jury was never permitted to make such a determination
because the court found that the plaintiff's injuries were constitutionally
insignificant as a matter of law.' 2 6
Similarly, in Morel, the plaintiff's mistreatment during arrest could be
characterized as not only physically abusive, but patently humiliating. '2 7
Yet, such plaintiff would not recover under section 1983 if a jury finds
120. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987).
121. See Lester, 830 F.2d at 712-13; McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th
Cir. 1988); see also Comment, supra note 2, at 1383 (damages recoverable even when no
physical injury is alleged under fourth amendment).
122. Cf Lester, 830 F.2d at 713 (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable
seizures irrespective of plaintiff's injuries).
123. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per
curiam).
125. These claims will invariably be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), which provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
126. See Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218, 1223-24 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
127. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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that his physical injuries were not "significant" under the Fifth Circuit's
test. The egregious circumstances surrounding Johnson's arrest would
be overlooked if the jury determines that he failed to meet the Fifth Cir-
cuit's quantum-of-injury requirement.
Although the severity of a plaintiff's injuries might properly be consid-
ered in assessing the reasonableness of a particular seizure, a jury should
not be instructed that a finding of severe or significant injury is the sine
qua non to recovery in an excessive force claim. Otherwise, jurors will be
unable to find for those plaintiffs who experienced unreasonable treat-
ment during arrest but sustained only minor injuries.
A. Fifth Circuit Backsliding
Although the general trend in contemporary Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has been to limit substantively a plaintiff's ability to prevail in civil
rights claims,12 the Court has recently augmented a plaintiff's ability to
sustain claims against police officers under section 1983. In Garner, for
example, the Court expanded the scope of police liability129 under section
1983 by invalidating a state statute authorizing the use of deadly force
against a non-violent fleeing burglary suspect. 130 The Court held that the
officer's use of deadly force under the circumstances was constitutionally
excessive even though the police officer had not deviated from depart-
mental policy or applicable state law.
13 1
Likewise, the Graham Court opened the door to increased section
1983 litigation by endorsing a lower threshold1 32 for finding police be-
havior during arrest unconstitutional.1 33 Before the Graham decision,
excessive force plaintiffs in jurisdictions employing a fourteenth amend-
ment standard were only protected from egregious13 1 police conduct that
128. See Bruce, Emotional Distress Claims for Police Misconduct: Does a Cause of Ac-
tion Really Exist Under Section 1983?, 22 Val. U.L. Rev. 61, 61 (1987).
129. See id. at 64-65.
130. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S 1, 11 (1985).
131. See id. at 20-22.
132. Many courts have observed that the fourth amendment reasonableness standard
is less stringent than the substantive due process standard under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, eg., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Rubin, J., concurring) (fourteenth amendment standard more "stringent" than
fourth amendment standard); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 1987) (Phil-
lips, J., dissenting) (objective unreasonableness test a "much less stringent standard" than
substantive due process), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989); Fonte v. Collins, 718 F. Supp.
1, 2 (D. Me. 1989) (excessive force claims should be analyzed under fourth amendment
standard rather than "heightened" substantive due process standard) aff'd 1989 U.S.
App. Lexis 3802.
133. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-73 (1989).
134. See, e.g., Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1982) (officer's
conduct must be "sufficiently egregious" to be actionable under section 1983); Wise v.
Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 1981) (police officer's conduct must be "egre-
gious") (quoting Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1019 (1981)); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982) (only
"egregious" police conduct falls within substantive due process protection); see also
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caused severe injuries. In contrast, the fourth amendment test an-
nounced in Graham is more restrictive, protecting individuals from po-
lice conduct that is objectively unreasonable.135
By imposing a "significant injury" requirement,' 36 the Fifth Circuit
has seemingly reversed the expansion of police liability under section
1983. The court has restricted the class of excessive force plaintiffs with
actionable section 1983 claims to those plaintiffs who sustained palpable
bodily injuries as a result of mistreatment during arrest. Such a require-
ment seems to be a veiled attempt to revive the "shock the conscience"
test 137 that the Court repudiated in Graham.131
B. Special Purposes of Section 1983
Section 1983 not only provides a right to compensation for physical
injury, but allows for the "vindicat[ion of] cherished constitutional guar-
antees."' 139 As explained in Wood v. Breier,14 section 1983 enables the
citizenry to safeguard constitutionally protected interests.
Each citizen "acts as a private attorney general who 'takes on the man-
tel of the sovereign,'" guarding for all of us the individual liberties
enunciated in the Constitution. Section 1983 represents a balancing
feature in our governmental structure whereby individual citizens are
encouraged to police those who are charged with policing us all.141
By requiring a threshold of injury, however, the Fifth Circuit discour-
ages plaintiffs from challenging the reasonableness of police activity
under section 1983. According to the test set forth in Morel, only plain-
tiffs who have sustained "significant" physical injury as a result of police
misconduct during arrest need apply for section 1983 recovery.' 42 Ar-
restees who are treated unreasonably during arrest but who fortuitously
avoid physical injury will be less inclined to press claims against police
officers under section 1983.
Advocates of a significant injury requirement would argue that these
plaintiffs can instead pursue battery claims against police officers in state
court. As the Supreme Court observed in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (conduct necessary to violate sub-
stantive due process must be "extreme or patently abusive" conduct).
135. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1385.
136. See Johnson, 876 F.2d at 480.
137. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
138. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989).
139. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (quoting Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (federal courts have power to award
damages for violations of "constitutionally protected interests").
140. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (1972).
141. Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
142. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per
curiam).
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Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,'43 however, existing state tort
remedies may be "inconsistent [with] or even hostile" towards federally
protected fourth amendment interests."4 For this reason, it seems, at
least one court has held that the existence of state tort remedies does not
preclude a plaintiff from bringing an excessive force claim under section
1983.145
A significant injury requirement, moreover, runs contrary to the
Supreme Court's characterization of section 1983 in Felder v. Casey.'46
The Casey Court indicated that section 1983 should not be construed to
impose substantial limitations on section 1983 litigation. 4 7 The Fifth
Circuit's quantum-of-injury requirement not only makes claims against
police officers more difficult, it renders them impossible for plaintiffs who
fail to show palpable bodily injury.
C. Section 1983 Damages Not Limited to Compensation for Physical
Injury
As the Supreme Court held in Carey v. Piphus,14 s actual damages need
not be shown in order to prove a constitutional violation under section
1983. It follows a fortiori that physical injury need not be shown in a
section 1983 suit. Rather, as the Court explained in Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura,149 the primary purpose of allowing damages
in section 1983 actions is to compensate for injuries caused by a violation
of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. 150
Stachura further explained that remedies available under section 1983
mirror remedies available in common-law tort actions.15 1 Therefore,
damages available to excessive force plaintiffs under section 1983 are ap-
propriately fashioned after the damages awarded plaintiffs in common-
law battery claims.'52 At common law, courts traditionally allowed
143. 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
144. Id. at 394.
145. See Felder v. Casey, 150 Wis. 2d 458, 473, 441 N.W.2d 725, 732 (1989).
146. 487 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1988).
147. See id.
148. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Carey, a high school student sued his high school princi-
pal under section 1983, alleging a due process violation. The Court held that although
the plaintiff had proven a due process violation, he could not recover compensatory dam-
ages in the absence of proof of actual injury flowing from the violation. See id. at 266.
The Court, however, awarded the plaintiff nominal damages, thereby acknowledging the
violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id. at 248.
149. 477 U.S. 299 (1986). In Stachura, the school board suspended a tenured school
teacher with pay because he taught sex education in class. See id. at 301. Although
Stachura was subsequently reinstated and lost no salary, he sued under section 1983,
claiming violations of due process and the first amendment. See id. at 301-02. The Court
permitted recovery for Stachura's personal humiliation, mental anguish and emotional
distress. See id. at 307.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 307 & n.10.
152. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Webb, 719 F. Supp. 610, 617-18 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (dam-
ages awarded for mental humiliation in an excessive force claim under section 1983).
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plaintiffs in battery actions to recover for any mental anguish such as
fright, revulsion or humiliation resulting from the tortfeasor's offensive
physical contact.'53
Contrary to dicta in Morel,154 excessive force plaintiffs should be enti-
tled to recover damages for any emotional distress or personal humilia-
tion incurred as a result of mistreatment during arrest, even when the
plaintiff has sustained no significant bodily injury. 55 A fair reading of
Graham compels a finding that fourth amendment rights are violated
whenever arrestees are treated unreasonably during arrest, irrespective of
the injuries they sustain.56
Furthermore, a jury may award nominal damages in an excessive force
claim where the plaintiff suffered no discernable physical injuries and
minimal mental anguish as a result of an officer's unreasonable use of
force.'57 Allowing recovery of nominal damages in an excessive force
claim acknowledges that constitutionally-protected interests were
violated.1
58
E. Judicial Expediency Should Not Be Elevated Above Fourth
Amendment Liberties
Admittedly, a "significant injury" requirement facilitates the disposi-
tion of excessive force cases. It enables judges to dismiss on summary
judgment all claims by excessive force plaintiffs who have pleaded only
minor physical injuries.1 59 Such a requirement may also facilitate the
dismissal of false or frivolous claims.
Fourth amendment safeguards, however, cannot be compromised in
the interest of judicial expediency. By dismissing excessive force claims
153. See, e.g., Glickstein v. Setzer, 78 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. 1955) (jury properly con-
sidered humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering in awarding damages); Smith v.
Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 91 N.W.2d 756, 764 (1958) (proper for jury to award damages
for mental anguish). See generally W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 9 (5th
ed. 1984) (discussing damages available to plaintiffs in battery actions).
154. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam).
155. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Webb, 719 F. Supp. 610, 617-18 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (dam-
ages awarded Biven's plaintiff where plaintiff suffered only transient emotional distress
and no physical injury).
156. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
157. Morel, 876 F.2d at 481 (Rubin, J., concurring); see Memphis Community School
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11(1986); see, eg., Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d
1462, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984) (nominal damages available in § 1983 claim analyzed under
fourth amendment); Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 677 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); see also
Bruce, supra note 128, at 67 (discussing availability of nominal damages for violations of
constitutional rights).
158. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1980); see also Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society."); cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
159. See, e.g., Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218, 1223-24 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff's injuries deemed insignificant).
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simply because plaintiffs suffered no "significant" physical injury, judges
will effectively bar legitimate claims of plaintiffs who were treated "un-
reasonably" during arrest but sustained no palpable bodily injury.
As Graham made clear, plaintiffs are entitled to have a jury assess the
reasonableness of police conduct under the "totality of circumstances."
Significantly, Graham's "not every push or shove" 160 maxim implies that
some pushes and shoves may in fact violate the fourth amendment. De-
pending on the circumstances, applying unnecessary physical force may
offend an individual's fourth amendment interests.
16 1
Graham cannot be read to stand for the proposition that all physically
coercive police conduct yielding little or no physical injury is reasonable
per se under the fourth amendment. Such a reading, apparently under-
taken by courts imposing a quantum-of-injury requirement, affords po-
lice officers an automatic right to inflict physical force as long as use of
force leaves no traceable physical injuries. As the concurrence warned in
Morel, such a standard may permit a police officer to escape liability
under section 1983 for beating a person on the head without justification,
if the beating causes only a bruise.1 6
2
CONCLUSION
Not all physically coercive police conduct attendant to arrest is reason-
able per se under the fourth amendment. As the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Graham, only careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each case will allow a fact finder to determine whether the totality of
circumstances justified the manner in which a particular seizure was car-
ried out. In some instances, even minimally intrusive force that causes
no serious bodily injury may constitute an unreasonable seizure under
the fourth amendment.
A significant injury requirement runs contrary to the fourth amend-
ment because it permits as a matter of law all physically intrusive police
behavior that does not result in bodily injury. A significant injury re-
quirement, moreover, thwarts the remedial purposes of section 1983 by
failing to allow plaintiffs to collect compensatory damages for non-physi-
cal harm.
Daniel J. O'Connell
160. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989).
161. A comment to the Second Restatement of Torts warns that a police officer "may
not misuse his custody by any conduct which is clearly unnecessary to maintain it and
which ... is grossly offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity or modesty."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 132 comment b (1965).
162. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 481 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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